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The Software Patent Debate
Andrés Guadamuz González*
It was never the object of patent laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling device, 
every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would naturally and spontaneously occur to 
any skilled mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of manufactures. Such an 
indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to 
stimulate invention. It creates a class of speculative schemers who make it their 
business to watch the advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam in the form 
of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy tax on the industry of the 
country, without contributing anything to the real advancement of the arts. 
U.S. Supreme Court, Atlantic Works v Brady, 1882 
1. Introduction
The approval procedure of the proposed Directive on the Patentability of Computer-
implemented Inventions1 (the CII Directive) has sparked a heated debate regarding the 
patentability of software2 in Europe, producing one of the most contentious intellectual 
property law policy discussions of recent years.
While the CII Directive has been rejected by the European Parliament,3 the road that 
led to the final vote was paved with arguments and counter-arguments about the role 
that patents should play in the protection of software. This debate, which had strong 
political implications, was tinted by emotional appeals, threats, inaccuracies and 
downright fabrications from both camps from the initial barrage. This article examines
the arguments raised and considers their validity.4
Before looking at these arguments I will explain, through reference to some recent 
cases, the state of the art regarding the legal protection of software. While the literature 
in this area is extensive and goes back several years, the time has come to take a step 
back and look at the debate again from its roots. 
2. Software Copyright: Copywrong? 
Since it became widespread and commercially valuable, software has been remarkably 
difficult to classify within a specific category of intellectual property protection. This 
                                                
* Lecturer in E-Commerce Law, University of Edinburgh and co-director of the AHRC Research Centre for Studies in 
Intellectual Property and Technology Law. This is a draft of the article by the same name that appears here: 1(3) 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 196-206 (2006). 
1 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the Patentability of Computer-implemented 
Inventions, COM(2002) 92,  http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/indprop/docs/comp/com02-92en.pdf . 
2 There are various definitions of software. That preferred here is U.S. Code Title 17, Chapter 1 §101 which defines a 
computer program as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring 
about a certain result.”
3 FFII, European Parliament says No to Software Patents (2005), http://wiki.ffii.de/Ep050706En.
4 The author acknowledges that it is possible that the paper will not be free from some of his biases with regard to the 
validity of software patents. The author’s position is of strong scepticism for software patents.  
2
is because software’s characteristics are unique among protected intellectual creations, 
presenting particular difficulties for those drawing analogies with existing legal 
subjects. Commentators have sought to classify it under copyright,5 patents,6 both,7
trade secrets8 or even as a sui generis software right.9 It is indicative of the complexity 
of the debate and the problems in defining the protection of software that, while this
issue has been the subject of discussion for more than twenty years, recent 
developments suggest that there is still no solution in sight.
But what is it about software that makes its unequivocal classification so difficult? The 
problem may lie in the fact that software is not a monolithic work: it possesses several 
elements that could fall within different categories of intellectual property protection.
If we define software as a set of instructions to a computer that bring about a certain 
result,10 the manner in which those instructions are expressed should inform us about 
the type of intellectual property protection that applies. These instructions are initially 
expressed as source code – lines of instructions in a computer language. Because the 
source code is expressed in written form, software may logically be defined as being 
subject to copyright protection as a literary work. This was the initial approach towards 
software protection in most existing legislation.11 However, software is not only source 
code; to be able to operate in a computer, software has to be translated into object 
code12 by a process of compilation. This translation has no bearing on the type of 
protection awarded to software because the object code is a direct result of the source 
code and should arguably be linked to its fate.13
A problem arises with the strict categorisation of software as a literary work because
software has other elements that may not be subject to copyright protection. Software 
is not merely literary expression: its lines of code have a function that is independent 
of the grammatical construction of the lines of code. The source code of a computer 
program, while completely different to that of another program, may yet have the same 
function and produce a similar set of instructions that achieve a similar result. This is 
the basis of the idea/expression dichotomy14 that is so frequently debated.15
Although there is some case law regarding literal infringement,16 the courts have 
struggled with the non-literal aspects of software infringement. Is copyright infringed
where the functional aspects of a computer program are copied? The answer has been a 
                                                
5 J Dunn, "Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Software" (1986) 38 Stanford Law Review 497. 
6 E Gratton, "Should Patent Protection Be Considered for Computer Software-Related Innovations?" (2003) 7 
Computer Law Review & Technology Journal 2 223.
7 R Widdison, "Software Patents Pending?" (2000) The Journal of Information, Law and Technology 3  
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2000_3/widdison/.
8 DW Carstens, "Legal Protection of Computer Software: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets " (1994) 20 Journal 
of Contemporary Law 13.
9 JC Philips, "Sui Generis Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software" (1992) 60 George Washington Law 
Review 997.
10 See definition used in supra note 2.
11 Harmonised in Europe through the Council Directive 91/250/EEC on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 
OJL 122/42. Also see Computer, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s.3 (1) b. 
12 Object code is machine-readable instructions that can be directly executed by the computer. 
13 This idea is not new: see Note, "Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code" (1983) 96 Harvard Law 
Review 1723. 
14 For more about the dichotomy see S Ang, "The idea-expression dichotomy and merger doctrine in the copyright 
laws of the US and the UK" (1994) 2 International Journal of Law & Information Technology 2 111. 
15 For example, see  D Luettgen, "Functional Usefulness vs. Communicative Usefulness: Thin Copyright Protection for 
the Nonliteral Elements of Computer Programs" (1996) 4 Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal 233; and LL 
Weinreb, "Copyright for Functional Expression" (1998) 111 Harvard Law Review 1149;  
16 Most recently Cantor Fitzgerald International v Tradition (UK) Ltd [1999] Masons CLR 157. 
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very complex and lengthy ‘yes’. This is evidenced by the initial application of the 
idea-expression dichotomy to software,17 then by the inception and reliance on the 
rather clunky doctrine of so-called Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison18 in the United 
States, which has been both applied and criticised by UK courts.19 Most recently, 
protection of the functional elements of computer software has been revisited in the 
United Kingdom in Navitaire v easyJet:20 a software company specialising in online 
airline booking software sued easyJet and software developers BulletProof, alleging 
that they had copied substantial functional elements from their reservation software.
There Pumfrey J significantly diminishes copyright protection of functionality: 
“Copyright protection for computer software is a given, but I do not feel 
that the courts should be astute to extend that protection into a region 
where only the functional effects of a program are in issue. There is a 
respectable case for saying that copyright is not, in general, concerned 
with functional effects, and there is some advantage in a bright line rule 
protecting only the claimant's embodiment of the function in software 
and not some superset of that software.”21
It is precisely the difficulty with protecting literal and non-literal elements of software 
that has created the perceived need for the patentability of software, since patents 
protect the functional aspects of works. There is no idea/expression dichotomy in 
patent law. If an idea fulfils the requirements for patentability –patentable subject 
matter, novelty and inventive step –it will be awarded patent protection.22 American 
courts had already opened the door to the patentability of computer programs by 
allowing a patent for software that controlled manufacturing processes as early as 
1981.23 Subsequent cases have expanded patentability of software in the United 
States.24 With the patent door open, and the seeming chaos in the copyright protection 
camp, the subsequent explosion in successful applications by software companies in 
the United States was no surprise.25
3. The European perspective
3.1 The road to the present
While the United States allows practically unlimited patentability of software in recent 
years, Europe is supposed to follow a different path, for two reasons. First there is a 
                                                
17 Found in Whelan Associates Inc v Jaslow Dental Laboratory Inc [1987] FSR 1. 
18 Found in Computer Associates International, Inc. v Altai, Inc., (2nd Cir. 1992) 61 USLW 2434. In short, this test 
abstracts all the elements found in the computer program, filters out the unprotectable ones and then compares what is 
left to search for similarities.  
19 Respectively, in John Richardson Computers Ltd v Flanders and Chemtec Ltd [1993] FSR 497; and Ibcos 
ComputersLtd v Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance [1994] FSR 275.
20 Navitaire Inc v easyJet Airline Co [2004] EWHC 1725 (Ch). 
21 Ibid, at para 94. 
22 WR Cornish and D Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks & Allied Rights, 5th ed 
(2003), pp.173-207.
23 Diamond v Diehr 67 L Ed 2d 155 (1981). 
24 Amongst others: Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc. v Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith Inc., 564 F. Supp. 
1358 (1983); and In re Alappat, 33 F. 3d 1526 (1994). 
25 For example, software patent applications had increased by 16% per year from 1986 to 1997. See: J Bessen and RM 
Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents, Research on Innovation Working Paper 03-17/R, (2004) 
http://www.researchoninnovation.org/swpat.pdf.
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clear-cut bias towards copyright protection through the Directive on the Legal 
Protection of Computer Programs.26 Secondly, Article 52 (2)(c) of the European Patent 
Convention (EPC) specifically states that computer programs “as such” should not be 
regarded as patentable subject matter. 
However, practice and case law have allowed the limited patentability of so-called 
“computer implemented inventions”27 that involve a technical effect (or contribution, 
or process).28 These cases recognise a limited patentability threshold where an
invention that will be implemented through a computer fulfils the requirement of 
technicality.29 While source code, or the literary and textual element of software, 
cannot be patented, software that produces some sort of effect in the same way that any 
other invention does, will receive protection. Precise definition of this technical effect 
or process has been hard to pinpoint in the more than twenty years since it was first 
enunciated by the Technical Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office (EPO).30
Decisions regarding software patentability follow arguments that resonate with those 
regarding the literal and functional protection of software in copyright. The EPO 
Board of Appeal shows this in VICOM, where situations where a computer process has 
a merely abstract and mathematical (unpatentable) effect are distinguished from those 
in which a computer process has a technical (one could read ‘functional’) effect and 
should therefore be subject to patentability.31 Further cases, toying with this 
distinction, have offered reasoning that is often muddled or contradictory.32
Nevertheless, some few principles can be gleaned from existing caselaw. First, 
software “as such”, meaning programs “considered to be mere abstract creations”,
remains unpatentable.33 Secondly the technical effect subject to the application must 
make a considerable contribution to the prior art. For example, Merrill Lynch says that 
“There must be some technical advance on the prior art in the form of a new result.”34
Nevertheless, even though most of the existing rulings share common elements, the 
real life application of these principles has been uneven in Europe, as is often the case 
with vague and ill-defined legal concepts. It This lack of clarity prompted the 
European Commission to propose the CII Directive,35 which was meant to overhaul 
European patent practices by making the wording of ‘technical effect’ more precise.36
The proposed Directive contained its own definition of what constitutes a technical 
contribution, similar to the requirements of prior art encountered in the case law,
stating that it meant “a contribution to the state of the art in a technical field which is 
not obvious to a person skilled in the art.”37 What made this Directive controversial –
and eventually spelt its downfall – was its approach towards the patentability of 
software “as such”, in contrast with technical effects. Article 5 clearly states:
                                                
26 Supra note 11. 
27 The author finds that this legal concept has been hijacked as a euphemism for the more charged term “software 
patent”. 
28 Cases such as VICOM [1987] 2 EPOR 74; Merrill Lynch’s Application [1989] RPC 561; Gale [1991] RPC 305; 
Fujitsu [1997] RPC 608. 
29 See Widdison, supra note 7.
30 In VICOM, T208/84.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Contrast for example, VICOM with Fujitsu. 
33 IBM, T0935/97, at 5.2.  
34 Supra note 28, at 569. 
35 Supra note 1. 
36 A Duffus, "The Proposal for a Directive on the Patentability of Computer-implemented Inventions" (2002) 16 
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 3 331.
37 Article 2(b).
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“Member States shall ensure that a computer-implemented invention may 
be claimed as a product, that is as a programmed computer, a 
programmed computer network or other programmed apparatus, or as a 
process carried out by such a computer, computer network or apparatus 
through the execution of software.” 
As mentioned, the practice in existing cases was not to patent computer programs “as 
such”, which seemed to exclude computer programs that provided a process in itself 
that was not technical. The problem with Article 5 is that it opened the door to the 
patentability of software “as such”, leading to comments that this opened the door to 
American-style unlimited patentability of software.38
This is not the place to describe the tortuous process that led to the eventual demise of 
the CII Directive. Article 5 was however at the centre of an almost unprecedented 
display of lobbying and activism, triggered by an apparently straightforward directive 
dealing with the application and harmonisation of some obscure legal technicalities of 
which most people in the mainstream had never heard. The proposal was met with 
vicious opposition from open source and free software activists39 whose opposition 
was echoed by some Parliamentary groups. The European Parliament was instrumental 
in the voting down of the Directive by eventually rejecting the Commission’s text by 
648 to 14 votes on 6 July 2005.40  
3.2 Technicalities in “technical”
The demise of the Directive leaves the issue of the patentability of software in Europe 
in the same situation as it was before the proposal in 2002. Since existing practice and 
case law still applies, it is important to consider them closely and try to gain an insight 
as to what may happen in the future.
The official line that only computer programs that contain a technical contribution will 
be patentable has been followed as well by the European Patent Office in their 
Examination Guidelines:
“if a computer program is capable of bringing about, when running on a 
computer, a further technical effect going beyond these normal physical effects, 
it is not excluded from patentability, irrespective of whether it is claimed by 
itself or as a record on a carrier.”41
However, the same Guidelines apparently recognise that the concept of technical 
contribution is problematic, recommending that examiners should first determine the 
novelty and inventive step of the claim before testing for technical contribution.42
United Kingdom Patent Office (UKPO) practice followed similar lines to the rest of 
Europe. However, the UKPO recognised that applicants and practitioners were 
confused as to the technical contribution requirements, evidenced in their early 
                                                
38 See for example, criticisms here: FFII, EU Software Patent Directive Core Amendments (2003),  
http://swpat.ffii.org/papers/europarl0309/cons0401/tab/index.en.html.
39 Some reasons for this opposition can be found here: A Guadamuz, "Legal Challenges to Open Source Licences" 
(2005) 2 SCRIPT-ed 2 163. 
40 See supra note 3. 
41 EPO, Examination Guidelines (June 2005), S. C, Ch. 4, 2.3.6. 
42 Ibid. 
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consultation regarding software patents.43 This uncertainty prompted the UKPO to 
organise a series of workshops in early 2005 in pursuit of a workable definition of
“technical contribution”.44 Those attending the workshops were presented with several 
different definitions of “technical contribution”45 and given three different types of 
case studies, to try to determine which definition fitted best. The case studies were 
made up of applications that, according to the UKPO, were (i) not patentable under the 
present law; (ii) patentable and (iii) borderline or doubtful applications according to
the existing guidelines. 
                                                
43 United Kingdom Patent Office, Should Patents be Granted for Computer Software or Ways of Doing Business?
(March 2001),  http://www.patent.gov.uk/about/consultations/conclusions.htm. 
44 United Kingdom Patent Office, The European Computer Implemented Inventions Directive - Report on the 
Technical Contribution Workshops, (2005),  http://www.patent.gov.uk/about/ippd/issues/eurocomp/full_report.pdf
45 Of which two were used in all the workshops, the definition from the CII Directive and a definition provided by the 
Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure (FFII), one of the main critics of  software patents.
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Table 1. Definitions A and B
Definition A (CII Directive) Definition B (FFII)
"Technical Contribution" means a contribution to 
the state of the art in a field of technology which is 
new and not obvious to a person skilled in the art. 
The technical contribution shall be assessed by 
consideration of the difference between the state 
of the art and the scope of the patent claim 
considered as a whole, which must comprise 
technical features, irrespective of whether or not 
these are accompanied by non-technical features.
"Technical Contribution" means a contribution 
made by a claimed invention, considered as a 
whole, to the state of the art in a field of 
technology. "Technical" means belonging to a 
field of technology.
New teaching about the use of controllable forces 
of nature under the control of a computer program, 
beyond the implementation of the data processing 
procedure itself, is technical.
The processing, handling, representation and 
presentation of information by a computer 
program is not technical, even where technical 
devices are employed for such purposes.
The results showed that Definition A would result in considerably more patents than 
definition B.46 Many of the other definitions fell along that same axis, with two 
exceptions. 
Table 2. Definitions F and L
Definition F Definition L (Current UK Law)
A technical contribution should make a 
substantial, non-obvious advance to the state of 
knowledge in a technical field, and should not be 
representable as pure logic.
"Technical Contribution" means a contribution to 
the state of the art in a field of technology which is 
new and not obvious to a person skilled in the art. 
The technical contribution shall be assessed by 
consideration of the difference between the state 
of the art and the scope of the patent claim 
considered as a whole.
In the case of a computer implemented invention 
the "Technical Contribution" must be realisable 
within the apparatus on which it is implemented.
A "technical contribution" cannot occur as a result 
of the coding of an algorithm or lie within the 
program code. A program may only make a 
"technical contribution" when the implemented 
function is used to contribute to the difference 
between the scope of the claim and the prior art.
A "Technical Contribution" cannot occur when the 
contribution lies solely in the application of a 
"business method, mental act or mathematical 
method".
These two definitions were less controversial and, according to the study, were “well 
liked”. Definition F was minimalist: its shortness and elegance may have played a part 
as to why it was chosen by participants. Definition L was penned by the UKPO as its
interpretation of what the current cases in the UK require. 
                                                
46 Ibid. 
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The workshop’s methodology is open to criticism on many grounds, including the 
reasoning by which some definitions were omitted.47 Also, the willingness to reach a 
middle ground assumed greater priority than the need to assess the underlying reasons 
for the study. The report repeatedly comments on how restrictive the definitions are, 
thus assigning positive or negative values to them. A strong opponent of software 
patentability might think that the most restrictive definition was preferable to the most 
permissive one, and vice versa. By favouring Definition L, the study apparently 
concludes that at least many workshop participants are content with the status quo and 
are happy to rely on it. Is this a good thing? 
Two recent cases assist in delineating the status quo. The first, Halliburton Energy 
Services, Inc. v Smith International48 involved two technologies: a cone drill to dig for 
gas and oil and a software simulation program for designing the drill bits. Halliburton 
sued Smith, claimed it held patents in both the drill and design software49 and that 
Smith was using similar software to produce comparable results. Smith questioned the 
patents’ validity. The design software patent contained a long technical description of 
drills and drill bits, plus a description of the algorithm50 used to design the software. 
The instructions to the person skilled in the art were extremely detailed and could only 
apply to that particular desired result. This seems precisely to be the type of patent that 
has a technical effect, however one defines it. Pumfrey J agreed51 that there was 
nothing wrong with the patent per se and that it fulfilled the requirements of 
technicality52. In this regard Halliburton represents a perfect example of a software 
patent that contains an unequivocal technical effect. 
The second case is CFPH LLC's Application.53  CFPH applied for a patent with one 
claim (later divided into two applications).54 The patent claimed a networked system 
for placing wages for current events in real time, where each event for which a wage 
was possible had a minimum wage amount. The system then checked the user’s 
available credit and displayed only those events where the user could place a bet. The 
UKPO rejected the claim because it did not produce a technical effect and because it 
described a business method, which is also not patentable subject-matter. 
On appeal, Deputy Judge Peter Prescott QC admitted having problems with the 
concept of technical contribution existing in practice and case law. Following a 
detailed analysis of existing cases, he offered a possible test for technicality:
                                                
47 Particularly, some of the tabled definitions from the European Parliament when criticising the CII Directive. See the 
Consolidated version of the amended directive "on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions”, Europarl 
2003-09-24. 
48 Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v Smith International [2005] EWHC 1623 (Pat).
49 Patent EP1117894 for the software and EP1112433 for the cone drill. 
50 An algorithm is set of instructions for accomplishing some task which from one initial state to an expected result. 
51 Halliburton v Smith, supra note 48 at paras 215-218.  
52 The patent was however invalid for inadequate disclosure: according to the court, the threshold of disclosure is much 
higher in highly technical areas such as this: para 133. 
53 CFPH LLC  Application [2005] EWHC 1589 (Pat). 
54 Applications GB 02268843 and 04193173. 
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“A patentable invention is new and non-obvious information about a 
thing or process that can be made or used in industry. What is new and 
not obvious can be ascertained by comparing what the inventor claims 
his invention to be with what was part of the state of the existing art. So 
the first step in the exercise should be to identify what it is the advance in 
the art that is said to be new and non-obvious (and susceptible of 
industrial application). The second step is to determine whether it is both 
new and not obvious (and susceptible of industrial application) under the 
description 'an invention' (in the sense of Article 52). Of course if it is not 
new the application will fail and there is no need to decide whether it was 
obvious.”55
This test seeks to apply the EPO’s guidelines as far as possible, but emphasising the 
case law and EPO decisions on the strict requirement of an inventive step that has a 
technical application.56 Unfortunately, this analysis did not advance our understanding
of ‘technical’, other than restating that the invention should have industrial application. 
The Deputy Judge was however correct to affirm that software, by the mere act of 
being software, should not be excluded from patentability: if it involves an inventive 
step, it could be subject to patent protection. As he concluded:
“The question to ask should be: is it (the artefact or process) new and 
non-obvious merely because there is a computer program? Or would it 
still be new and non-obvious in principle even if the same decisions and 
commands could somehow be taken and issued by a little man at a 
control panel, operating under the same rules? For if the answer to the 
latter question is 'Yes' it becomes apparent that the computer program is 
merely a tool, and the invention is not about computer programming at 
all.”57  
In the author’s opinion, this presents the best test for patentability of software yet 
devised: the “little man” test. If the software is immaterial to the claim, and if the 
software fulfils other patentability requirements, then the patent should be awarded. 
Given such a useful definition, it is strange that the UKPO has missed some of the 
finer points of this ruling in its new recommendations regarding patentability.58 The 
new examination recommendations come in the aftermath of Halliburton and CFPH.
While dealing with other considerations, they also comment on “technical 
contribution”. While acknowledging the new two-step test in CFPH, the guidelines 
state that “the change in approach does not change the boundary of what is 
patentable.” I beg to differ strongly with this conclusion. 
4. To patent or not? 
It is clear that existing procedure is well-established in favour of some limited 
patentability of software, even after the defeat of the Directive. European 
Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner has pointed out that, despite the vote, “patents 
                                                
55 CFPH Application, supra note 53, at 95. 
56 Ibid, at 94. 
57 Ibid, at 104. 
58 United Kingdom Patent Office, Patents Act 1977: Examining for Patentability, (July 29 2005),  
http://www.patent.gov.uk/patent/notices/practice/examforpat.htm.
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for computer-implemented inventions will continue to be issued by national patent 
offices and the European Patent Office under existing law.”59 This is an accurate 
statement: existing practice has led to a large number of European patents protecting 
processes found in computer software.60 While the figure are far lower than in the 
United States,61 that the number of approved software patents is higher than would be 
expected in a region where computer programs are supposed to be excluded as 
patentable inventions.
It would be disingenuous to believe that the matter of software patents will be debated
less in the coming years. If the practice is in favour of patentability, but legal 
definitions remain unclear, the time is ripe to question whether the patentability of 
software is itself beneficial. This section analyses the validity of some of the 
arguments for and against the patentability of software. 
4.1 Arguments for patentability
A strongly compelling argument for the patentability of elements found in a computer 
program is similar to those arguments supporting the patentability of any other 
invention. If a computer program contains elements that meet patentability 
requirements, it should be awarded software protection. Since software development is
a technical field like any other, its results should be patentable.62 This argument should 
be examined and expanded in light of the traditional justifications for the existence of 
patents in general. 
Patents are commonly justified as a contract between inventors and society, where the
former are awarded a limited monopoly for a period of time while the latter obtains a
description of how others can work the invention.63 If this argument is valid, society 
can only benefit from the patentability of some software inventions because the 
technology to work those ideas will be disclosed in the application, something that 
would not happen if the software was protected as a trade secret or under copyright. 
Copyright owners do not need to publish the source code, which makes working the 
software more difficult. Some even argue that the disclosure element of the patent 
system allows for more openness in the software development market.64 This argument 
is compelling when one sees that the software industry requires openness and 
interoperability of standards in order to let programs to interact with one another. 
However, openness can be obtained within a copyright-only framework of protection 
through the use of alternative development models such as open source software, 
where the source code is made available to the public, ensuring openness and 
                                                
59 European Parliament, Debate: Patentability of computer-implemented inventions, (6 July 2005),  
http://tinyurl.com/8op7z.  
60 It is difficult to obtain actual data. According to FFII the EPO has approved more than 20,000 software patents. See 
http://swpat.ffii.de/patents/stats/index.en.html. According to the United Kingdom Patent Office, of about 30,000 
applications received each year, 20% are related to software, see http://www.patent.gov.uk/about/ippd/issues/cii-
ukposition.htm. 
61 In 1980 there were about 1,080 software patents issued that year, while in 2002 there were 24,891 patents issued. See 
Bessen and Hunt, supra note 25, p.47.
62 Argument often made by patent expert Greg Aharonian in his mailing list, PATNEWS. For example, PATNEWS 
20050217 contains a discussion of why software is just a technical abstraction, and therefore, subject to 
patent protection. 
63 JP Kesan and M Banik, "Patents as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D Investment with Incentives 
to Disclose Prior Art" (2000) 2 Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law 23. 
64 BL Smith and SO Mann, "Innovation and Intellectual Property Protection in the Software Industry: An Emerging 
Role for Patents?" (2004) 71 University of Chicago Law Review 241. 
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interoperability.65 Openness can also be obtained by the proliferation of non-
proprietary standards and standard-setting bodies66 that establish a common framework 
for development, which can be achieved without patents. 
Another traditional justification of the patent system is that it serves as a just reward 
for the effort that has gone into the making of the invention: software should be no 
different in this respect. The reward in the shape of a patent serves as an incentive to 
new innovators, as it can be argued that developers need means to recuperate their 
investment. Says Gratton:
“Incentive is important for software developers - to reward those who 
invest their time and money in technological invention and innovation, 
and thus to encourage such investments, has been the classic function of 
patents. In other areas of innovation, patents have encouraged substantial 
investment in research and development and have generally promoted 
innovation. There is no reason why the position should be any different 
for software developers or businesses.”67  
This argument would be credible were it not for the fact that it has been established in 
the literature that patents work really well as an incentive for innovation in some areas 
of technological innovation, but not in others.68 Software development is a vibrant area 
of innovation, despite the uncertain nature of its legal protection. The success of open 
source software also serves to diminish the claim, as there is a field of endeavour 
where thousands of developers innovate without the incentive of patent protection.69
Moreover, there is little direct evidence that software patents generate an incentive for 
innovation. In a report to the European Parliament, Bakels and Hugenholtz point out 
that there is not enough empirical evidence to demonstrate a direct causal relationship 
between innovation in the software industry and patents.70 Correlation does not mean 
causation. 
Besides the traditional justifications for patentability, the main other argument for 
software patents has been the economic case. The patenting of computer inventions 
benefits large firms because they have the resources to apply for patents.71 However, 
most of the literature defending computer implemented inventions, argues that 
software patents also benefit small and medium enterprises (SMEs), because small and 
medium developers need patent protection if they are to enhance their profitability. A
group of SMEs supporting the CII Directive gives several reasons why software 
patents are advantageous to their interests, including the failure of copyright to protect
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functional elements in software, provision of an incentive to investors and better 
channels for earning profits from licensing.72
Problems with this position have been pointed out even in pro-patentability papers and 
studies.73 A significant objection is that SMEs are extremely unlikely to rely on patents 
for protection of their software because of expense, fearing to enter into patent disputes 
with wealthier firms.74 Furthermore, there appears to be little agreement even among
SMEs about whether software patents are needed. Several studies have found a sharp 
divide between independent developers and some smaller businesses already 
established in the industry – those in an already advantageous position seem to be in 
favour of patentability, while smaller independent firms are against.75 Similarly, a
study to the European Commission dealing with the patentability of software in 
Europe, comments:
“There is considerable evidence of concern by European independent software 
developers about the potential effects of patents on the development of computer 
program related inventions.”76
An area in which software patents evidently prove to be an advantage is investment. A
well-established link exists in the United States between intellectual property assets 
and investment in a business, particularly from venture capitalists.77 However, if 
software patents allow investment, this benefit could be counterbalanced by software 
patentability’s potential disadvantages, which will be analysed next. 
4.2 Arguments against patentability
Reading some of the many websites that oppose software patents, one obtains a
different picture of the ongoing debate. Many of these sites have no cohesive and 
relevant criticisms of software patentability in the European context. These sites offer
considerable equivocation, misunderstanding, exaggeration and even conspiracy 
theory, which do not assist the debate. One such site claims that software patents are 
pushed by greedy patent lawyers whose goal is to destroy copyright protection of 
software because copyright is free.78 But that is not to say that well-stated and valid 
arguments against patentability do not exist. 
One argument that carries more weight in the literature has been that software patents 
encourage the creation of so-called “patent thickets”: a dense undergrowth of 
interrelated patents that researchers have to navigate in order to develop new 
technologies. There are two different types of thickets. The first one is a single 
technological innovation that may be protected by several patent holders. This 
situation would require anyone interested in developing software in that area to obtain
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separate licences from numerous owners.79 The second type of thicket occurs when a
product is covered by a large number of patents, not just one.80 Patent thickets increase
the cost of innovation; they encourage inefficiency through the creation of complex 
cross-licensing relations between companies and they may even stop newcomers 
entering the market if they fail to penetrate the thicket. However, at least one 
commentator takes issue with critics of patent thickets: even where thickets exist, they 
have no effect on innovation through research and development spending.81
Another argument addresses the nature of software. If software has both functional and 
literary elements, the prominence of one of those elements as software’s defining 
characteristic should give us a better idea of how to protect it. As Eischen eloquently 
explains:
“Is software an act of engineering or communication? If software is a 
rational endeavor, improving quality involves better and more resources: 
better management, better tools, more disciplined production, and more 
programmers. If software is a craft, improving quality involves the exact 
opposite: focusing on less hierarchy, better knowledge, more-skilled 
programmers, and greater development flexibility.”82
This argument is a key reason why discussion about the nature of software protection 
persists after all these years. The problem is that each camp holds an entrenched view 
of what software is. 
Some of the most vocal and active criticisms of software patentability lie within the 
Free and Open Source (FOSS) movements. A major plank upon which they base their 
opposition is that most open source licences are copyright licences. For example, of 
the 58 licences certified by the Open Source Initiative (OSI)83 as complying with the 
open source definition, only the Apache Software License and the Open Software 
License contain clauses assigning patents owned by the licensor. The most used FOSS 
licence – the GNU General Public Licence (GPL) – goes further than providing a mere 
assignment, as it states in its preamble part of the case against software patents from 
the perspective of FOSS ideals: 
“[…] any free program is threatened constantly by software patents. We 
wish to avoid the danger that redistributors of a free program will 
individually obtain patent licenses, in effect making the program 
proprietary. To prevent this, we have made it clear that any patent must 
be licensed for everyone's free use or not licensed at all.”
Until recently the GPL was considered to provide adequate protection against software 
patents by ensuring that a software project could not be hijacked by a patent owner and 
a wilful infringer of the licence.84 This changed in recent years with the increase in 
software patent applications and, more importantly, with what FOSS developers 
perceived as a decay in the quality of patents granted by the USPTO. This reasoning 
suggests that the lack of patent quality means that patents are increasingly granted for 
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processes and ideas that are obvious, do not represent an obvious step or do not have 
prior art. As Bruce Perens says, “the vast majority of software patents, some say as 
high as 95% of them, are actually invalid due to the existence of prior art.” 85 The 
result a software environment polluted by bad software patents that affect open source 
developers who do not have the resources to defend themselves against allegations of 
infringement and cannot attempt to declare the patents invalid.86
From a European perspective, the arguments of the FOSS community against software 
patents are often informed by American practices. Many argue that the problem in the 
United States is not specifically with software patents but with the entire American 
patent system, bad-quality software patents being just part of the general lack of 
quality of patents currently emanating from the USPTO.87 In particular Jaffe and 
Lerner warn: “The real enemy of open-source software – and software innovation 
more generally – is the abysmal implementation of software patents, not the 
concept.”88
Is the situation only desperate for American open source developers, or is the same
problem experienced in Europe too. So far, the fears of open source developers should 
be unjustified because Europe has not granted so many software patents. Nevertheless, 
there are enough examples of European patents that protect elements found in software 
that are not innovative and which in many instances have considerable prior art against 
them.89 Another worrying example is that of the European LIBDCA open source 
software project, part of the VideoLAN project that produces the open source media 
player called VLC.90 LIBDCA is just one of the components of the media player used 
for decoding a proprietary media format called Digital Theater Systems (DTS).91 This 
format is protected by patent EP0864146 in Europe and US Patent 5,956,674.92 DTS 
Inc, the owners of the patents, have sent a cease-and-desist letter to the LIBDCA 
project alleging infringement of their patent.93 As a result the source code for the 
encoder had to be removed. 
Cases like LIBDCA illustrate a major problem concerning software patents that open 
source advocates predicted. A patent owner threatens a small open source project, to 
which there is no other recourse than to cease the development of the software because 
the project cannot oppose the patent even if it suspects it could be invalid. Patent 
litigation is expensive and a small open source project, or SMEs developing 
proprietary software, often cannot afford to oppose patent claims against them. The 
grant of software patents makes open source developers believe that Europe has
embarked on a slippery slope that will lead eventually to American-style patentability.   
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Despite the examples cited, most fears and concerns of the open source community
have not yet come to pass. FOSS’s development has blossomed despite the chaotic 
state of patentability of software in the United States and there has been no patent 
infringement litigation against any open source project.94 However, the fact that the 
war has failed to materialise does not mean that it is not coming. Open source 
advocates are justified in being wary about software patents, but such fears should be 
proportional to the actual threat. 
5. Conclusion 
The demise of the CII Directive has left Europe in turmoil because the debate has not 
been resolved, only postponed. The EPO and national patent offices continue to 
struggle with the nebulous legal concept known as “technical contribution”. 
Meanwhile one hopes that harmonised and rational practice will soon arise. Cases such 
as CFPH are encouraging in this respect. 
Nevertheless, the law cannot ignore the wider policy issues at stake. The software
patentability issue is difficult to resolve, considering the astounding diversity of 
opinions about the mere nature of computer programs. This being so, it is difficult to 
attempt to research the software industry in Europe and provide a balanced and 
measured study of the facts. Such a study is not feasible: research in this area will 
always have to deal with preconceptions and biases. Despite this, the main arguments 
offered by those who support wide patentability appear to lack the strength and 
decisiveness to eliminate all criticisms made by those against them. The situation is not 
as bad as the most belligerent websites and weblogs suggest. It is however clear that 
there are indeed some problems with software patents, particularly as a threat to those 
who have chosen the non-proprietary development route and are releasing their 
programs as open source software. 
The author believes that there is insufficient evidence that software patents result in 
increased innovation. On the contrary, fears about a system paralysed by the fear of 
infringement are more likely to hold sway with those familiar with software 
development. It is difficult to justify protection for a field of endeavour in which a 
significant amount of innovation comes from developers who have no interest in 
obtaining and seeking patents. One should be wary of those who argue that the 
industry will collapse without patents; just using any open source software product will 
prove them wrong.  
If we are still discussing the legal nature of software, perhaps the most obvious way 
forward is to resurrect the argument for creating a new type of protection. A sui 
generis software right could be the only solution to marry the functional and literal 
elements present in computer programs. But this discussion is an entirely different 
subject. 
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